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Accountant Versus Embezzler
By E. A. St. John
Every day, every hour, in all parts of the United States is
fought a silent but active warfare, in which hundreds of account
ants seek to detect some tell-tale discrepancy revealing a de
falcation, and in which hundreds—yes, hundreds—of embezzlers
strive to conceal their thefts by an endless and highly interesting
variety of bookkeeping tricks.
In this country alone, embezzlers steal more than $100,000,000
every year; and, but for the vigilance and efficiency of account
ants, would make away with an inestimably larger sum.
The fifty fidelity insurance companies of the nation paid
$9,235,836 in embezzlement claims in 1922 and their payments
during the previous decade increased steadily as follows:

Year
Embezzlement
1910................................................. $1,396,081
1913.................................................
2,030,201
1918.................................................
3,060,348
1919.................................................
4,633,604
1920.................................................
5,623,819
1921.................................................
8,270,000
Naturally, therefore, we surety folk watch the constant,
nation-wide accountant-versus-embezzler struggle with a very
practical interest.
A careless accountant who overlooks small irregularities in a
set of books or a weak-spirited accountant who permits himself
to be persuaded to take an easy-going attitude about small
irregularities may cost the surety companies very heavy losses.
Since the fee of the accountant is not paid by the surety com
pany but by the surety company’s obligee, the accountant feels
no obligation to protect the surety company.
But accountants have obligations to the public as well as to the
business people who employ them; and so, in reporting a small
embezzlement, should warn the employer against leniency or
concealment, for many embezzlers whose first offense has been
forgiven have subsequently embezzled very large amounts, and,
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whenever even the smallest irregularity is not reported to the
surety company, the fidelity bond becomes void from that time.
Some years ago a state bank examiner discovered some small
irregularities in the accounts of the popular and magnetic manager
of a suburban bank. He complained to the bank’s directors, who
were local tradesmen inexperienced in banking, and they per
suaded him to ignore the irregularities because the manager was
a “good business getter” and a “valuable employee.” Several
years later the bank examiner, in his periodic visit, discovered
that those first small irregularities had grown to a $300,000
shortage, which closed two banks, ruined a community and caused
at least one despairing depositor to commit suicide.
Accountants, when on a job, must avoid all personal entangle
ments.
An accountant down south was employed periodically to
examine the books of a small bank. He found the bank manager
very attractive and obliging. Whenever he got ready to compare
the totals of the individual accounts with the totals of the general
ledger, the manager always offered to help by reading off the
totals while the accountant himself operated the adding machine.
This went on for many years until the accountant had a tempo
rary illness and another accountant came in his place. The bank
manager took one look at the new accountant’s firm jaw and
impersonal face, and then got his hat, excused himself and dis
appeared, never to return. By reading false totals to the first
unsuspicious accountant, he had been enabled to conceal a series
of embezzlements totalling $60,000.
An accountant’s good name is his chief capital. A good name,
once compromised, is almost impossible to get back. Four
$1,000 bills were once placed on the desk of the assistant cashier
of a small town bank. The bank occupied an old-fashioned build
ing with cracked wainscoted walls. At the end of the day, the
four $1,000 bills had disappeared and could be found nowhere.
The assistant cashier was discharged under suspicion and no
other concern would employ him in a position involving any
trust. He had no money; nor had he friends in other towns so
that he could start again elsewhere. For years he could get only
the most menial positions. Then the bank was remodelled and
the four $1,000 bills were found to have slipped behind one of the
cracked walls. The discredited assistant cashier sued the bank
for his lost name and got a jury verdict. But the money damages
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did not compensate for his wrecked business career and years of
business ostracism.
Causes of the great increase of embezzlement in the United
States during the last decade are largely due to increase of op
portunities which, in turn, are due to the increased complexity
and elaborateness of business. Close supervision of trusted em
ployees is very difficult, if not impossible nowadays; and little or
nothing is known regarding the antecedents, private lives, temp
tations, etc., of trusted employees. References of trusted em
ployees are often not investigated; if investigated they are usually
done so only by letter or telephone. My company has actually
found criminals with prison records employed in financial insti
tutions, discovery of these records being made only when we were
asked to issue fidelity bonds.
It is next to impossible for even the ablest accountant to dis
cover an embezzlement if the embezzler’s tricky technique is
flawless and if the embezzlement does not become too large.
But here are some typical recent embezzlement cases with the
suggestions of my associate, Herman J. Lofgren, as to how an
efficient accountant might have detected them.
Example No. 1

A cashier received cash deposits made by customers in payment
for stocks for margin deposits which he appropriated to his own
use to the amount of $12,900. He kept this shortage covered by
substituting cheques received from clients for the cash and in
creasing his bank balance over night to cover up the deficit until
he received further deposits the next day to make good.
In order to misappropriate the $12,900 it is evident the cashier
resorted to the time honored method of “lapping” and raising
bank balances by making entries for receipts not deposited in
their entirety.
To manipulate the accounts successfully, all entries on the
cash blotters would be made by the cashier. The postings there
from to the customers’accounts would be made by the bookkeeper,
and entries on the margin cards would be made by the margin
clerk.
Monthly statements to customers would be mailed as is cus
tomary and apparently everything would be in proper order.
In order to detect or circumvent such schemes, the accountant
should check all cash credits to customers? accounts against cash
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blotters, foot cheque books and reconcile bank balances for all
months during the period of his audit, and where necessary ob
tain original deposit slips from banks.
Modus Operandi
Currency received
John Brown............. ( 1)......... $1,500
James Smith............................. 1,000
F. Jones.................... ( 3).........
750
C. Chandler............. (4)......... 1,750
T. Bryant
650
V. S. Beatty (2).......... ( 1,250
H. H. Lovett........... ( 3)......... 1,500
J. L. Gray................ ( 5)......... 8,400-500 Appropriated
Jas. F. Ballinger.. .. ( 6)........
700
L. L. Wilson............ ( 7)......... 1,250
M. R. Cox................. (8)........ 1,150
W. J. Muir................ ( 9)........ 1,000
W. J. Turpin.............(10)........
500
M. C. Miner............. (11)........
500
$14,000
Cheques received:
Geo. I. Brandon.. ( 1).......... $2,500
R. Alexander.... .( 2)........ 1,900
Substituted for items 1 to 4
C. W. Wright.... .(3)........ 2,250
R. L. Holland.... (4)........ 1,750
$ 8,400
Ledger Accounts
BANK ACCOUNT BLANK TRUST CO.

1923
January 1st Balance...................................................
January 31st Deposits, items 1 to 4..........................

Debit
$25,000
8,400

Credit

Actual balance............. .............. .....
33,400
Amount raised by fictitious entries on
cheque book stub.........................
14,000

$47,400
Capital and sundry liabilities:
January 1st, 1923, Balances...................................................
Sundry customers’ accounts:
January 31st, Credits..............................................................

$25,000
$22,400

Example No. 2
A bookkeeper, trading in three different accounts kept in his
wife’s name, lost money in the trades and to make the accounts
good transferred credits from interest and commission and part
ners’ accounts to make good his margins to the extent of $29,000.
To cover up the losses sustained in trades the bookkeeper would
manipulate his books in the following manner:
Total debit to customers for interest charges as per
interest book...................................................... $30,000 (1)
(Footings on interest book would then be changed
to read, viz.: $25,000)...........................................
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Interest credit to earnings.......................................
(1) $25,000
Concealed or direct ledger credit posted as a cash
receipt to wife’s account
.........................
(1) 5,000
Concealed or direct ledger debit to partners’ ac
count ...................................................................
20,000 (2)
Concealed or direct ledger credit to wife’s account
(2)
20,000
Charged to customers for commissions.................
50,000
Credit to earnings.....................................................
46,000
Concealed or direct ledger credit to wife’s account
4,000

Carried forward................................................. $100,000

$100,000

The accountant should prove the footings of the interest book
and check the total credited to earnings. Likewise the commis
sions on purchases and sales of stocks as shown by the blotters
should be proved and checked against the amount credited to
earnings. If this is done for all months to be covered by the
audit irregularities as described will be quickly revealed.
Example No. 3
Assured’s bookkeeper and order clerk acting in collusion traded,
buying and selling stocks which were paid for by the firm in the
belief that the trades were genuine, they using the name of several
customers who had had accounts but whose accounts had been
closed. They made fictitious entries in the books, did not carry
margin cards and when the books were audited borrowed bal
ances from accounts which had credits to offset the debit balances
existing in the accounts being used.
The detection of manipulations of this character depends to a
great extent upon the nature and scope of the accountant’s ex
amination.
According to the language of the problem, customers’ accounts
with full credit balances were used to clear the debit balances in
the amounts being used for trades.
This illustrates very forcibly how imperative it is for the ac
countant to mail confirmations to all customers, whether their
accounts are closed or not. Such confirmations should state the
amount of the debit or credit balance, and the long or short posi
tion. If there is neither a balance nor stock position, the state
ment should so read. When the statements were incorrect com
plaints would quickly follow and the irregularities would thus be
disclosed.
Example No. 4
A customer’s man using the name of a relative, trading without
the knowledge or consent of the firm, ran into a loss which the
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margin clerk failed to report to the firm on the statement of the
other employee that the customer was good for the loss and
would make it up. The market continued to go against the
traders. The margin clerk, to conceal the losses, took the margin
card out of the box and when the firm discovered the condition of
things there was a loss of about $130,000.
Strictly speaking, this is not an accounting problem, but is a
case of dereliction on the part of the margin clerk. Neverthe
less, an alert bookkeeper would see almost at a glance that the ac
count was under-margined or without equity, and unless he was
in collusion with the customer’s man and margin clerk, he would
report the matter to the office manager or a member of the firm.
If the books were being audited, the condition of the account
would be disclosed the moment the accountant made up his
equity statement.

Example No. 5

Two employees of a stock brokerage house created a loss of
approximately $25,000. These two men, one a bookkeeper and
the other a margin clerk, were acting together in buying and sell
ing stocks in four accounts. Three of the accounts were opened
in good faith and were closed by the original owners. After they
had ceased operating, however, these men continued to buy and
sell, using these accounts, and they opened another account
which was entirely fictitious. They were able to cover these
transactions by switching debit balances to other accounts and
when the auditors came in at the end of the year they took out
the loose leaves from the ledgers and substituted loose-leaf pages
from other accounts showing the necessary balances to make the
individual accounts balance with the general ledger.
In this instance, the switching of debit balances to other ac
counts has a tendency to make the accounts so debited undermargined or without equity. Manipulations of this character
present little or no difficulty to the experienced Wall street ac
countant.
By taking the trial balance for the month previous to that of
the audit the ledger accounts and balances would be established,
and by checking the entries for the current month the irregulari
ties and substitution of other ledger leaves would be apparent
and the necessity of a detailed audit of the accounts disclosed.
Furthermore, a check of the long and short positions as shown
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by the customers’ accounts with the stocks and bonds record
would show that the accounts were irregular.
Example No. 6

Principal was manager of the Indianapolis branch office of a
Chicago stock brokerage house. He admitted a shortage of
about $45,000. The shortage accrued through the unauthorized
trading by him in the accounts of two of the big customers of the
firm. His books agreed at all times with the firm’s Chicago books,
but statements sent to these two customers by the Chicago office
were intercepted by the defaulter and false statements were
made up by him showing the balance each would have had
if principal had not traded on these accounts. Then, to keep
these customers in good standing with the margin clerk at the
Chicago office, principal reported having received securities to be
held as collateral. It was only when the Chicago office sent to
check the collateral that principal’s depredations were discovered.
It is evident that all trades in the Indianapolis office were made
through the head office in Chicago where all accounts with cus
tomers were kept, Indianapolis records being subsidiary thereto.
Cash receipts and disbursements would be deposited in Indian
apolis and reported to Chicago. Stocks and bonds purchased for
customers would be in Chicago either in box, in loans or in trans
fer. Chicago would draw on Indianapolis from time to time.
All loans would be made in Chicago. Stocks and bonds held for
safekeeping could be either in Chicago or Indianapolis.
In order to keep the two customers’ accounts in good standing,
the Indianapolis manager would report having received certain
securities as collateral which he had placed in his box. On re
ceipt of this information, Chicago would make the customers
“long” and securities in box in Indianapolis as the offset.
The non-existence of said securities would be revealed when
the accountant would make up his own securities record. It is
possible that the Indianapolis manager might try to cloud the
issue by asserting that the missing securities were in transit,
but this could be readily verified by communication with the
Chicago office.
Example No. 7

Defaulter, who was the manager of a bank, drew numerous
cheques for office expenses, proceeds of which he pocketed. To
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cover these charges he put these items in suspense and then
transferred them into the personal account of the president of the
bank, who never checked up his account and never knew how it
stood. By this method the defaulter was able to get away with
approximately $30,000.
In auditing a bank, the accounts on the general ledger should
be analyzed by the accountant. If this is done the washing of
items in the manner outlined in the problem is quickly disclosed.
Generally speaking, it is unusual for banking institutions to
make payment in cash for items of expense, unless the amount
be very trivial. This being the case, disbursements of the char
acter mentioned would call for close scrutiny and explanation.
The frequency of the disbursements and the lack of supporting
vouchers would, in the writer’s opinion, arouse suspicion as to
their authenticity, particularly as they were eventually charged
to an individual’s account.
Example No. 8

The defaulter was a teller in the savings department, an em
ployee who had worked his way up through a period of years from
office boy in the banking department to teller in the savings de
partment, and could therefore be expected to be familiar with
the accounting system of all departments of the bank. His
method consisted in entering the deposits as and when received
on the depositors’ pass books and on their savings account cards
but omitting to enter the amount on his teller’s lists and omitting
to account for the money to the banking department. The
above procedure would of course throw the trial balance of the
savings account cards out of balance with the banking depart
ment control account. To prevent its discovery, it would appear
that whenever a proof of the balance in the savings department
was to be made, fictitious debits for the amount of the shortages
at that date were made to accounts known to be inactive and the
trial balance was thereby reduced to the amount called for by the
control account. After serving their purpose, these fictitious en
tries and the adjusted balances were erased and the original
figures re-entered. By confining these operations to ledgers sec
tions “4” and “5,” ample time was afforded to make the adjust
ing entries while proofs were being taken of ledgers “ 1,” “2,” and
“3.” Undoubtedly the above procedure was facilitated by the
fact that the defaulter acted both as receiving teller and book
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keeper, also by the fact that he was later allowed to take off the
trial balances. Total loss was $14,986.20.
This problem emphasizes the fallacy of permitting an employee
of any banking institution to occupy a dual position and to al
low the same person to take off a trial balance.
To detect manipulations of this character the pass books
should be called in for comparison with the account cards. If
the officials deem this inexpedient then the whole of the account
cards should be taken away from the teller when least expected,
the deposits and withdrawals listed and compared with the gen
eral ledger control. Then the jig will be up.

Example No. 9
Defaulter bought all of the postage stamps used by house.
He was a trusted employee in the “cage,” and all his requisitions
were O.K.’d by his immediate superior. He secured money from
the cashier from time to time with which to purchase stamps.
Some of the stamps were used for the registered mail going direct
from the “cage,” but the larger part, as a rule, was used by the
mailing department. Defaulter supplied this department with
stamps, taking receipts from the mail clerk. All money paid to
the defaulter for the purchase of stamps was charged to a “stamp
postage” purchase account on obligee’s books (an asset account).
Periodically he would prepare a journal voucher relieving the
“stamp-postage” account and charging “expense account.” To
this entry he attached the vouchers received from the mail clerk
and to cover his shortages which amounted to approximately
$20,000 arising from his failure to use the money for stamps in
the way it was intended to be used, he would prepare vouchers
similar to those taken from the mail clerk and forge the mail
clerk’s name to them.
In the first instance the increased expenditures for postage
should have been sufficient to warrant investigation.
The writer maintains that casual inspection of vouchers is
insufficient. Signatures on vouchers of this kind call for close
scrutiny. If this is done the calligraphy of the perpetrator even
tually betrays him.
Example No. 10

The head bookkeeper of a bank, by switching credits from a
large account to a small account of another customer, permitted
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the latter to overdraw his account approximately $7,000, of which
head bookkeeper later received a share.
Statements of customers’ accounts should be made up by other
than those in charge of the individual ledgers, and upon their
completion they should be handed to the bank auditor who should
mail them personally.
Illicit withdrawals in the manner described cannot continue
indefinitely if the above safeguards are in operation.

Example No. 11
The trusted manager of a New York dry goods store took
quantities of merchandise from his employer and with it stocked
a store of his own in an adjacent street. Business increased yearly
in the store in which the manager was employed, but yearly bal
ances showed dwindling profits and finally startling losses. The
proprietor reluctantly was persuaded to employ detectives to
trace the trusted manager, and the rival store was soon discovered.
The simplest sort of inventorying and auditing would have dis
closed the shortage in merchandise while the losses were still small.

Example No. 12
A $25 a week clerk in the employ of a New York wholesale
grocer, through conspiracy with a driver and outside confederates,
stole and resold large quantities of incoming merchandise. The
proprietor, paying a rare visit to the shipping room, noted that
this poorly paid clerk wore a silk shirt. Investigation disclosed
that the clerk was living in a $3,500 apartment with servants and
an automobile.
The making of an inventory would have disclosed these pecu
lations.
Example No. 13
A branch manager, in collusion with a dishonest attorney, divid
ed with that attorney collections secured from various debtors’
accounts which had been turned over to that attorney for collec
tion by manager. The attorney would collect such accounts, but
report them as uncollectible. This report would be sent to the
home office by the manager and the accounts marked off. These
operations were carried on for three years before accidental dis
covery was made and the surety company paid a bond of $10,000
on this loss.
Careful checking by an accountant of individual accounts and
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confirmations mailed to all customers, especially those whose
accounts had been reported as uncollectible, would have disclosed
these peculations.
Example No. 14
A young man employed as bookkeeper and cashier in a large
refrigerating company, by overlapping items, managed to make
away with $25,000 in cash in a period of two years. A part of the
concern’s business was to lend money on cased eggs placed in cold
storage, and to release the eggs when the loan with interest and
storage charges was paid. The bookkeeper-cashier upon receiv
ing such payments would issue an order releasing the cases in
volved, credit the customer’s account and charge a correspond
ing amount erroneously to some other accounts, consequently
leaving his cash balance as if the amount manipulated had not
been received.
At the time this young man was employed, it was the practice
of the concern to have quarterly audits and inventories made by
certified public accountants. This was continued during the
first two years of the new bookkeeper’s employment, by which
time he had become a trusted employee, and was bonded in the
sum of $1,000. At the suggestion of someone the quarterly audits
and inventories were abandoned, and thereafter each month the
bookkeeper-cashier prepared a trial balance of his books which
was accepted by the treasurer as correct.
Two years later the employee failed to report for work, and it
developed that he had left home. A new bookkeeper was em
ployed but demanded that an audit be made before he took over
the books. A six weeks’ audit disclosed irregularities and a short
age in the original employee’s accounts of more than $25,000.
A continuation of the quarterly audits and inventories would
have disclosed irregularities of this sort had they been attempted.
The case indicates that the irregularities would not have been
attempted if the inventories and audits had not been abandoned.
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